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1Democracy, protest and public sphere in Russia after the 2011-12 anti-government 
protests: digital media at stake
Abstract:
The 2011-2012 Russian protest mobilisations were largely enabled by the rise of social 
networks. Social and technological advancements paired to pave the way for the ‘’biggest 
protests since the fall of USSR’ (BBC, 2011). Ubiquitous and uncensored social media 
facilitated the networking and mobilisation for this protest activity: liberal masses were able to 
share and discuss their grievances, unite and coordinate online for the offline protest. The 
digitally savvy protest public developed to confront the government, which appeared to be 
astonished by the scale of protest. Those mobilisations marked an important gap between the 
government’s conception of the society and the real state of resistance. 
This paper studies three main hypotheses regarding the potential of the protest movement in 
Russia. The hypotheses were drawn from recent sociological, political and media studies on 
Russian resistance. Current research aims to contribute to the debate from the digital media 
perspective. It therefore evaluates three main assumptions: digital media have the potential to 
empower, dependent upon the relevant political, social and economic factors; digital media 
isolates protest publics and therefore may be more useful for the government than the 
resistance; recent censorship of digital media communication signals a tightening of both 
formal and informal restrictions against opposition and protest politics.
This article uses theoretical and factual evidence on the limitations on democracy and the 
public sphere, and conceptualises the government’s management of resistance in Russia 
during and after the 2011-2012 protests. It studies how the hybrid political regime in Russia 
balances restrictions on freedom of speech with strengthened state propaganda; how it 
mediates media oppression and invites self-censorship. Lastly, it examines how the state 
communication watchdog has recently focused its attention at the digital realm. This move 
confirms the importance of the online protest communication for the Russian political 
environment. Yet the state’s acknowledgement of digital political resistance may lead to further 
oppression and curbing of this emerging component of Russian politics.  
Keywords: Russia, protest, digital protest, public sphere, hybrid regime, digital resistance, 
democracy, social media, digital activism
The Russian political system is often characterised as a hybrid regime (Petrov et al., 2014). It 
contains elements of democracy and autocracy in substantial measures. However, the term 
2‘democracy’ often appears in public speeches of Russian officials, making it a regular 
constituent of the government’s self-representation. In the early 2000s President Vladimir 
Putin’s spin doctors implemented the term ‘managed democracy’ in the hegemonic discourse 
(Lipman and McFaul, 2010), thereby implying that it was still important for the Russian state 
to appear democratic. Yet, by the mid-2010s, the governance had embraced many autocratic 
measures, including eliminating political and media opponents, directly controlling regional 
elections and corrupting the economy (Petrov et al., 2014; Kiriya, 2012). 
The interrelation of democratic and authoritarian traits in the Russian political system is 
dynamic, as the ruling elites change their approach depending on the circumstances, that is, 
they make specific choices in each particular case. Petrov et al. (2014) distinguished three 
main spheres where hybridity reaches its peak: elections, mass media and state institutions. 
In recent years, the Russian government has established a large number of ‘substitutions’ - 
puppet replacements for an independent electoral system, mass communication and 
representative institutions (Petrov et al., 2014).     
The media sector has been under particular scrutiny. Authoritative governments require high-
quality information and insights about the society to use them for their own interests and 
maintain the power relations (Shirky, 2011). The acknowledged demand for opposition voices 
and accountability may be among the reasons why the Russian government preserves a 
mixed media system consisting of state-controlled and independent outlets. This input from 
the liberal-minded professional journalists and resistant leaders allows the authorities to adjust 
their policy and guarantee popularity among the masses. Russian elites deliberately permit a 
small amount of liberal media to allow those in disagreement to release steam and 
consequently refrain from action (Petrov et al., 2014). 
Information is a valuable asset in restricted media environments. While the government can 
impose control over traditional media, the digital realm remains less manageable due to its 
networked structure and global penetration (Shirky, 2011; Iosifidis, 2011; Zuckerman, 2013). 
Authoritarian and hybrid governments have to deal with the ‘dictator’s dilemma’ when 
designing censorship and trying to restrain the Internet. The term refers to the dilemma created 
by the development of new media that increase public access to information, promote 
discussion and mobilisation and become problematic for the state (Shirky, 2011). The 
availability of liberating media tools puts the dominant regime at risk, and the ruling elites have 
to respond. The first immediate answer is censorship and propaganda. The alternative would 
be to shut down the Internet as a whole. However, the elimination of the Internet would not 
only silence those in dissent, but also disturb and radicalise the pro-government majority that 
would resist the measure. Besides, the state risks advertising resistant groups and speakers 
by pressing harsh charges against them. As a result, the most common solution to the 
dictator’s dilemma, as the Russian case proves, is selective censorship and direct and indirect 
pressure.
The Russian government has replied to the dictator’s dilemma in the media industry on several 
levels. First, in the last decades the Kremlin has increased its ownership in major broadcasting 
media, ensuring that the most popular Russian medium is under the total control of the state 
(Kiriya, 2012; Robertson, 2012). Second, it has used economic pressure on private 
companies. Third, a series of restrictive criminal laws has assured the population of the 
government’s ability to find legal pretext to withdraw a publication or prosecute its author. 
Many of the restrictive laws are vaguely worded and open to interpretation, thus making media 
3extremely vulnerable to state abuse (see Malgin, 2014). Subsequently, all these measures 
have led to the emergence of self-censorship among media professionals and popular 
bloggers.   
Hypothesis 1: Digital media have the empowering potential yet largely depend on 
political, social and economic factors
Anti-government protests of 2011-2012 in major Russian cities indicated that the Kremlin 
lacked information about the protest moods in parts of its society. It is believed (Robertson, 
2012) that the government underestimated the amount of liberal publics. Massive rallies 
against the results of the corrupted Parliament elections gathered up to 100,000 people in one 
of the central squares in Moscow (BBC, 2011). The government did not expect these numbers 
and initially rushed to condemn the protests (Petrov et al., 2014). It did not stop the 
mobilisation, however, as people continued exposing the corrupt officials in social networks, 
and calling for new rallies. There were two waves of mass protest: first in 2011 after the 
Parliament elections and second in early 2012 before and after the Presidential elections. 
The very first mobilisation of 2011 gained the name of ‘snow revolution’. The title was coined 
as a metaphor: snow is known to come unexpectedly and melt with the spring (Robertson, 
2012). The same was said about the first attempt of politicised Russia to express itself – the 
press called the massive protests ‘unexpected’ and saw them vanish when spring came. By 
May 2012, the hopes of protesters had faded, as the massively criticised Vladimir Putin was 
elected President again. His press secretary Dmitry Peskov responded harshly to the protests, 
accusing them of violent behaviour towards police. He used bitter rhetoric on the issue, 
reportedly noting that ‘an injured riot police officer should be avenged by smashing protesters' 
livers on the asphalt’ (Hoft, 2012: para. 2). 
The whole social stratum of protest publics was not born in one day. Russian protest activities 
have changed considerably over two decades, from the 1990s to 2011: from local issue-
based, direct action protests, to major political 'democratic' style marches, rallies and 
gatherings with demands to curb corruption or calls for the government to obey the law 
(Robertson, 2012; Gladarev, 2012; Clement, 2012). Since the mid-2000s, Russian society has 
been gradually learning to become politically aware. By 2011, ‘the organizational and cultural 
apparatus for large scale protests was already in place’ (Robertson, 2012: 2). The uprising of 
the 2010s indicated the society’s request for new power relations in the country. A significant 
part of the population was ready to express their discontent and felt empowered to openly do 
so. 
In late 2011, Putin’s government fell victim to its own authoritarian management of political 
and media systems (Petrov et al., 2014). American academic, and former US ambassador to 
Russia, Michael McFaul (2007: para. 19) noted that ‘Putin has systematically weakened or 
destroyed every check on his power, while at the same time strengthening the state's ability 
to violate the constitutional rights of citizens’. Not only lack of information, but also lack of 
representation of different groups in public institutions resulted in street unrest, the last resort 
for the under-represented to have their voice heard. Not by chance, one of the most popular 
slogans of the 2011-2012 rallies was ‘You do not even represent us/ You have no idea who 
we are’ (‘Vy nas dazhe ne predstavlyayete’). In Russian, the slogan is a single phrase with a 
pun in it (the verb ‘predstavlyayete’ meaning both ‘imagine’ and ‘represent’), while the English 
translation requires two sentences.    
4Curiously, the 2011 protest slogans exploited a lot of humour, puns and jokes. As Asmolov 
(2012) explains, people were not showing anger at their leaders but, rather, laughed at or 
mocked them. This may have signified the end of fear of the government. Educated urban 
middle-class citizens were at the forefront of the newly emerged protest mobilisation (Levada-
Centre, 2011; Robertson, 2012), and the digital technology was one of their strong mobilisation 
and organisational weapons. Creative forms of dissent, such as street theatre and 
performance art joined the arsenal of protest weapons. Many mobilisations in big cities 
obtained traits of theatricality (Gladarev, 2012): for instance, in St Petersburg people were 
protesting against the construction of the skyscraper that would damage the skyline of the 
historical city centre. During their demonstrations, they were wearing costumes that resembled 
historical buildings, or invited passersby to help them build a ‘tower’ of the cans of canned 
corn. The activists suggested that this version of the proposed skyscraper would emphasise 
the ugliness and inappropriateness of the actual project of the city authorities. 
These findings can be explained using Bakhtin’s concept of the ‘carnivalisation’ of protest, a 
dissent expressed in an artful form, a glorious ‘celebration’ of the civil society (Bakhtin, 1984; 
Gladarev, 2012: 24). The Russian hybrid political system of the 2010s disabled traditional 
institutions of representative democracy and inadvertently forced the public to be inventive in 
their dissent. ‘We are learning to be citizens,’ one protester explained during the 2012 protest 
(Englund and Lally, 2012: para. 6). Gudkov (2012) calls the 2011-2012 protests a significant 
rise of civil activism, a call for dignity of life and equality before the law after a decade of 
political apathy. This new style of protest (BBC, 2011) demanded new language. 
Carnivalisation of the expressive practices of dissent led to the production of Internet memes 
that served as the verbal and visual expression of the dissent’s views and values and matched 
the globally experienced ‘need for alternative repertoires for political expression and 
mobilization’ (Norris, 2007: 641). The Internet memes constitute puns with ambiguous 
meaning. They have proven to be instrumental in overcoming censorship. Russian and 
Chinese protest activists (see Li, 2010) have notably utilised many, similar memes in recent 
dissent communication due to their capacity to express a political message in a humorous and 
seemingly harmless form.
Contemporary protest mobilisations – with Russia not being an exception – are often 
leaderless and coordinated by networks of networks (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Asmolov, 
2012). The Russian protesters of 2011-2012, Asmolov (2012) suggests, were networked 
individuals who made a conscious choice to participate in protest activity both online and 
offline. This evaluation fits into Norris’ (2007) acknowledgement of the rise of alternative 
organisational and framing forms of activism. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have introduced 
the concept of ‘connective action’ that partially replaces ‘collective action’ in the current 
electronic environment; contemporary mobilisations can be leaderless and organised by the 
efforts of networked crowds. Castells (2007) and Wellman (2001) encourage the shift from 
analysing societies built on place-based solidarity to ‘networked societies’ organised around 
networks of individuals. Social networks have a potential to serve as ‘fragmented systems of 
joint action’ (Lindgren and Lundstrom, 2011). Sharing individualist accounts permits users to 
become more involved in large-scale communication and mobilisation (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012; Diani, 2011) without swearing allegiance to any established political party 
or organisation. Granovetter's (1973) ‘strength of weak ties’ further explains how disperse 
weak connections may provide access to larger populations than strong consistent ties. 
Therefore, social networks that loosely unite various users with bespoke personal accounts 
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for engagement of all sorts. For instance, Gerlach's (2001) study on social movements and 
digital networks revealed that interpersonal communication becomes more instrumental for 
the popularisation of movements than shared ideologies.
Nonetheless, the accumulation of protest publics in a virtual space does not secure the 
initiation of collective activism. Juris (2012) criticises the connective action concept with his 
notion of 'aggregation'. He states that masses of users may indeed unite in a shared digital 
platform and even follow the same interests and webpages. Yet this assembly is weak and, 
without additional organisation, has a high risk of remaining a crowd of disengaged individuals. 
A large amount of personalised frames may amass a chaotic collective space in need of 
filtering and supervision (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011). Besides, the open nature of digital 
communication leaves room for misunderstandings that can lead to alienation and 
fragmentation of publics. It is hard to predict which personal action frames will get recognition 
and spread (Morozov, 2011; Morozov, 2013). 
Partially due to the absence of trustworthy representative democratic institutions, Russian 
opposition users coordinated independently via digital networks, thus revealing the 
significance of ‘networked individualism’ and ‘strength of weak ties’ for the Russian networked 
mobilisation. Russian dissenters employed traditional tactics of political struggle (rally, 
speakers, posters), but enriched them with digital tools (raising the awareness and 
coordinating via social networks, reporting in real time on Twitter, connecting with like-minded 
individuals online and so forth). Interactive technology not only facilitated information 
dissemination, but aided mobilisation. 89% of participants of the Sakharova square rally in 
December 2011 learned about the event online (Levada-Centre, 2011). However, Russian 
protest activity post-2012 has been mostly confined to the digital realm. As such, it cannot 
sustain the legitimacy of the connective action concept for the Russian case. 
Russian social mobilisation of 2011-2012 was activated by socioeconomic and technological 
development. After the Soviet time and prosperous 2000s, Russia demonstrated one of the 
fastest Internet usage growths in the world. In 2011, 37 million Russians were logging onto 
the Internet every day, and 52 million were using the Internet some of the time (Englund, 2011; 
Aron, 2012). Lally (2011) adds that, by 2011, three out of four Internet users aged 25-34 would 
go online every day, twice as many as among their parents' age. Not only the generational 
divide and availability of technology, but also a so-called existential or mindset divide can be 
noticed here. 'This new generation know more freedom than fear', Lully (2011: para. 6) 
suggests. The advance of technologies and young generation's media literacy skills made the 
Internet a huge advantage for those advocating for freedom of speech and democratic change 
in the country. As one of the December 2011 protesters put it, ‘The Internet is the only way for 
people to find out the truth. I'm on the Internet until my eyes hurt’ (Lally, 2011: para. 48). 
However, many Russian scholars (see, for instance, Dmitriev, 2012; Rogov, 2012) refrain from 
being overly optimistic about the future potential of Russian protest activity. An established 
sociologist, Rogov (2012), for instance, points to the polarisation of the country in two ‘camps’: 
Russia-1 and Russia-2. Russia-1 consists of 44-50 million people living in large cities, 
belonging to the middle class and having a higher or professional education, who are able to 
access the Internet and may be interested in politics. Russia-2, in contrast, is made up of the 
rest of the population: 100 million people living in small cities with low income, low level of 
education, constant exposure to state television channels, and scarce or no access to modern 
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limited interest in modernisation and politics. Dmitriev (2012) and Gudkov (2012) back this 
view by adding that Russia-2 is a solid social base for anti-modernisation. It mostly consists 
of regions that live on government subsidies, and whose citizens are accordingly 
'paternalistically oriented' and do not express any interest in a pluralistic political system. This 
binary division is limited, however, as it does not incorporate all the complexity of media uses 
and political experiences of Russian citizens. Lipman (2010) and Aron (2012) assume that the 
citizens of less-developed Russian regions are very diverse in their social statuses, levels of 
education and political sentience. In support of this, the national survey on corruption held in 
2012 (The Moscow Times, 2012) revealed that every third Russian was outraged by the level 
of state corruption. The study took place in 43 Russian cities and involved 1600 respondents, 
involving ‘Russia-1’ as much as ‘Russia-2’. Recent sociological studies (Volkov and 
Goncharov, 2014) demonstrate that even those with high digital literacy and a habit of 
harvesting their news from the Internet may not be prone to liberal moods per se. These users 
exploit a variety of media sources to get their information and analysis (up to 4 or 5 media 
outlets, both traditional and electronic), yet tend to seek the points that confirm their pre-
existing views (Volkov and Goncharov, 2014). Therefore, even digitally savvy publics may 
demonstrate high approval levels of the government and engage in the online discussions that 
praise the elites (Volkov and Gocnharov, 2014; see also Cottiero et al., 2015).  
Conclusively, Russian digital resistance has a potential to inform and connect protesting 
publics. Yet the social and digital divides make it problematic to unite populations in the 
political discussion online. The tradition of media consumption along with the intensified state 
propaganda make it challenging for protest activists to attract more members of the general 
audience. However, the Russian digital realm has proven to be a developed space for the 
deliberation and advancement of resistant ideas and identities. Before the 2010s, protest 
groups and opposition publics were marginalised (Robertson, 2012). The 2011-2012 
mobilisations helped the liberal audience to realise the need for self-identification and self-
representation; they started building connections among like-minded individuals and 
appointing leaders. The experience of initiating and maintaining online and offline mobilisation 
empowered resistant audiences with the vital skills of spreading information, mobilising and 
coordinating protest. The peak protest activism of 2011-2012 revealed the power of creative 
and humorous forms of communication for bypassing censorship and accumulating the 
unconventional dissent discourse. The development of online protest activism of the 2010s 
demonstrates that the digital realm matters and remains a precious hub of information and 
communication in the restricted media environment of contemporary Russia.
Hypothesis 2: Digital media isolate protest publics and therefore may be more useful 
for the government than resistance
The power of Soviet tradition is still evident in the habits of media consumption in Russia. The 
majority of the population are constantly exposed to the state-controlled television and 
consider it the main source of news and interpretation (Kachkaeva and Kiriya, 2007). In the 
USSR, maintaining an effective propagandist media and culture was crucial for the state to 
promote and preserve the Soviet identity (Kiriya, 2012). The centralised flow of mass 
communication was accessible to all as television and radio broadcasting reached people free 
of charge and had no advertising. Newspapers were sold to individuals at a fixed price; 
besides, one free copy of every issue was sent to the workplaces of all the citizens, making 
sure they had access to it (Kiriya, 2012). Counter-flows soon emerged as some people were 
7looking for a wider understanding and reflection on political, social and economic 
developments of the state – these alternative media and tiny cultural production was called 
shadow activity. ‘Samizdat’ became one of the key forms of cultural opposition; a dissident 
activity that involved individuals copying prohibited books by hand and secretly passing them 
to each other (Saunders, 1974). 
Nonetheless, Kiriya (2012) suggests that this cultural dissent communication was maintained 
and followed by a very narrow group of people as the majority were inevitably exposed to the 
large-scale mass propaganda. The economy had no small share in it. The state-controlled 
economy provided for the production of a centralised flow of media and cultural products – as 
non-profit projects, state media and culture relied solely on the state budget. Alternative means 
of information had therefore to be fuelled from individual resources that were limited in the 
socialist Soviet economy. Kiriya (2012) calls the accessibility of media and culture in the Soviet 
times a type of social contract where accessibility was exchanged for control over content. 
The modern condition of Russian media resembles the Soviet media system as the state 
controls media and culture either directly (through ownership), or legally (restricting laws, 
imposing censorship and limiting certain types of expression), or via financial grants given to 
loyal culture figures. The current Russian social contract over the media has a few liberal 
television and radio channels (Ren-TV, Echo of Moscow, Dozhd), which Kiriya (2007) counts 
as an institutionalised alternative media sphere. 
The majority of Russians are accustomed to using the media as the main interpreter of reality 
(Kachkaeva and Kiriya, 2007). They see them as a state establishment that explains and 
enlightens. Only a minor part of the audience exercises a more practical approach to the media 
- utilising them as a source of information, but making decisions themselves (Klimov, 2007). 
A small number of independent offline media and the Internet serve the needs of these people 
(Kiriya, 2012). It should be noted though that many researchers (see, for instance, Kiriya, 
2007; Kiriya and Degtereva, 2010) call the few remaining ‘alternative’ media ‘information 
ghettos’ that reproduce the tradition of the dissident parallel communication of the USSR. The 
government further challenges the engagement of the large audience with the digital media 
discussions: it consistently refers to the liberal protesters and critical users of social networks 
as ‘traitors’ (Yaffa, 2014; Kates, 2014). This negative labelling presents any criticism emerging 
from the digital realm as biased and ‘paid for by the West’ (Kates, 2014: para. 5), thus 
encouraging the general population to treat the Internet with prejudice.
The state may tolerate these alternative voices to monitor the non-hegemonic political and 
social discourse (Etling et al., 2010). The communication watchdog is empowered enough to 
exercise control over offline media, but has less influence over the Internet. People generate 
content on many platforms, including social networks that are often owned by Western 
companies, which creates difficulties in access and control.
On the other hand, the open and ubiquitous character of the Internet, the disorderly 
interconnection of multiple discussions and its flexible structures (Iosifidis, 2011) are simply 
characteristics of a useful tool. Yet it is for the population to decide how to employ it: for political 
or many other reasons (Helsper, 2008). The number of Russians using the Internet for political 
information and discussion is relatively low. By 2010, the number of Internet users interested 
in politics and public affairs in Russia consisted roughly of 11,000 people (Kelly et al., 2012; 
see also Etling et al., 2010), which seems moderate for a country with 140 million citizens. 
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combine the benefits of blogging platforms with the networking features of social networking. 
For these reasons many of them prefer Facebook to other social networks. News and opinions 
may migrate from blogs to the opposition outlets, but rarely find a way to the institutionalised 
outlets of the dominant media. Kiriya (2012) further notes that politically engaged social media 
users generate a parallel public sphere online, the realm that does not intersect with or 
influence the dominant discourse (see also Smyth and Oates, 2015). From this perspective, 
the government may tolerate the existence of digital clusters of dissent communication in 
social networks – liberal users engage there, but rarely transfer their discourse to larger media 
platforms with more exposure to a general audience. The tendency to engage in ‘clicktivism’ 
further fosters the isolation of Russian dissent users in a number of limited online aggregations 
(see Smyth and Oates, 2015, or Nikiporets-Takigawa, 2014, for recent study of the Russian 
politicised Twitter). One may feel as if he or she has already contributed to the protest activism 
by sharing or ‘liking’ an opposition message or criticism (Halupka, 2014); the low level of 
commitment and high level of reward for this online activity may inhibit further offline activism 
or efforts in spreading the dissent campaigning to larger media platforms. Nonetheless, the 
recent research on the development of pro-elite and protest networks in the largest Russian 
social network Vkontakte (Shertsobitov, 2014) suggests that many active digital protesters of 
2011-12 have transformed their efforts in the formation of NGOs, election monitoring, anti-
corruption blogs and other types of civil campaigning. These findings further display the 
existing restrictions on the protest political activism in Russia, as users largely prefer to engage 
with civil activism and refrain from forming political movements (Sherstobitov, 2014). This may 
signify self-censorship at the level of personal identity (many Russians traditionally resist being 
distinguished as ‘political activists’, referring to themselves as ‘active citizens’ or ‘civil activists’ 
(Clement, 2012), as well as the fact that the expansion of political resistance requires many 
other factors beyond the availability of the Internet (Smyth and Oates, 2015). Structural, 
political and economic opportunities are required in order to let activists exploit digital media 
as a tool in further mobilisation and protest community building; connective action cannot yet 
replace collective action in the Russian case.  
Discussion on the applicability of the public sphere concept to the Russian online 
sphere
Applying the concept of public sphere to the restricted media environment may be a 
challenging task, but it has some potential in the Russian case nonetheless. Habermas (1989) 
defined ‘public sphere’ as an open inclusive democratic space for mutual exchange of ideas 
from individuals of all backgrounds and interests. Cyber-optimists led by Benkler (2006) insist 
that networked communication has the phenomenal potential of facilitating public sphere. It 
can promote freedom of speech and balanced discussion, a flow of information and ideas 
existing even under an authoritarian state. The idea of seeing Russian cyber-resistance as 
‘networked public sphere’ remains strong among Western media scholars (see Etling et al., 
2010; Kelly et al., 2012; among many). 
However, other researchers argue that access to the Internet does not guarantee that the 
society would use it for creating liberal and open public spheres. For instance, Papacharissi 
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Internet users to engage in politics and generate a valuable discussion. Furthermore, Cass 
Sunstein (2001) reminds of the risk of fragmentation and isolation, as digital communication 
can result in the creation of numerous ‘echo chambers’, where like-minded individuals isolate 
themselves in small groups (see also Gilbert et al., 2009). This corresponds to the concern 
expressed by Dahlgren (2006) and Wellman (2001) who noted that different social groups 
may use the Internet in different ways and establish segmented communities, ‘public 
spherettes’ of micro-publics (Cammaerts, 2008). 
The Russian Internet does not fit into either of these extremes. We can hardly call the Russian 
Internet - and social networks in particular - a networked public sphere, because the 
information flow is dispersed among various platforms, not all groups of population are 
represented, and political discussion gets disordered and unbalanced (Kelly et al., 2012; Etling 
et al., 2010). At the same time, Russian social networks cannot fit into the ‘public spherettes’ 
definition. According to the recent findings of the Russian blogosphere of the 2000-2010s 
(Etling et al., 2010), politically active Russian users engage in cross-linking debates and are 
less likely to form self-referential ‘echo chambers’ than Internet users in the US, for instance. 
However, the inclination towards ‘public spherettes’ and fragmentation may be strong in 
certain clusters of political communication online. Politically informed users tend to filter out 
the opinions that do not correspond to their pre-existing views (Sunstein, 2001). 
Furthermore, Fossato et al. (2008) have developed a list of the specific features of Russian 
cyberspace in their widely cited account of the political use of the Internet in Russia. They 
argue that politically active users in Russia demonstrate a high level of suspicion and mistrust. 
There is a lack of established opposition political parties and anti-government communities, 
and people fear manipulation by the government. State propaganda employs plenty of paid 
users, as well as brainwashing through government-funded traditional and online media, and 
soft filtering of the content. Besides, state officials can frighten, compromise and convert 
leaders of the liberal political discussion in the blogosphere, there have been examples 
(Sunstein, 2001). Last but not least, the Russian Internet audience seems to be quite resistant 
to political campaigning on the Web and does not engage much in traditional politics (Fossato 
et al., 2008). The protests of 2011-2012 have so far remained the largest manifestation of the 
discontent of resistant population. When the 2011 protest’s leader Alexey Navalny ran for the 
mayor of Moscow in 2013, he only came second (Schepp, 2013). Prior to that, during his 
campaigning, he had almost no or limited coverage in traditional media. The result of the 
elections proves, on the one hand, that digital politics have yet to find the way to connect with 
a large number of offline public. On the other hand, it also shows that the popularity of blogging 
and microblogging has a democratising potential and may facilitate alternative information 
flows. 
In conclusion, the Russian online environment is far from being a networked public sphere but 
has significant potential in providing alternative flows of information, ideas and debate. The 
alternative political communication online remains largely contingent upon the historical 
tradition of alternative public sphere in the USSR, such as samizdat and forbidden culture. 
While this communication in the Soviet times did not aim at political change, it raised the 
awareness of political wrongdoings and exposed lies of the state propaganda. Yet the Soviet 
alternative political sphere remained isolated from the public discourse and could not affect it 
much. The contemporary digital resistance in Russian social networks facilitates spread of 
information and the raising of awareness, but has little influence when it comes to recruiting 
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new members or generating a change offline. Protest users and groups tend to connect with 
like-minded individuals and communities. The government’s policy restricts the availability of 
alternative voices as liberal media are small and limited in their penetration. At the same time, 
politically active social media users often remain isolated in their echo chambers and have 
little impact outside their circles. 
Hypothesis 3: Recent censorship of digital media communication signals a tightening 
of both formal and informal restrictions against opposition and protest politics 
Researchers believe that it was Vladimir Putin who first understood the importance of state 
control over the media in the Russian state. It was he who came to rule in 1999 and reversed 
the privatisation of the media, thus ending the relative media freedom and commercialisation 
of the 1990s (Lipman and McFaul, 2010; Chernikova, 2014). From 1999 till the present day, 
Russian state media policy has developed to be more and more restrictive over alternative 
spheres and discourses. Large broadcasting and print media are subjected to censorship and 
filtering of their content (Koltsova, 2006); only a few independent media outlets had survived 
by 2015. Managers and top editors of the main broadcasting companies are required to attend 
Friday meetings in the Kremlin where pro-government points are distributed and the media 
agenda shaped (Baker and Glasser, 2007). 
The economic crisis of 1998 became a turning point in the popularity of the Russian Internet 
– people were looking for additional sources of information in order to protect themselves from 
the falling economy. By 2000, the Russian Internet had 3 million users (Chernikova, 2014). 
The next big step for the RuNet was the year 2008, when the Russian-Georgian 5-day war 
caused a wave of publications in independent online media and blogs. Many of those outlets 
gained significant popularity and were featured in the rating of top blogs provided by the 
biggest Russian search engine ‘Yandex’, and the Mailing system Mail.ru. Opposition blogging 
and criticism of the government thus became too visible for the general audience. By that time 
the Kremlin was even considering creating a state search engine, but cancelled the project 
due to the high costs of production and promotion (Chernikova, 2014). The government then 
reportedly pressed Yandex to close their ratings system. This caused a backlash from the 
blogging community as users blamed the company for restricting freedom of speech. The 
Internet ownership wars of the 2000s (Chernikova, 2014) indicated that the government 
became aware of the growing influence of the medium and attempted to secure control over 
it.
The 2011-2012 protests in Russia coincided with many other resistance movements and 
protests all over the world. The political power of social networks became evident in many 
recent social uprisings, especially in the Middle East, the US and the UK (Occupy) movements 
(see Anderson, 2011; Lotan et al., 2011; Juris, 2012). The Russian government publicly 
condemned the global and Russian protests and swiftly introduced a series of the most 
restrictive laws in current Russian media history.
The legislative projects that followed the 2011-2012 social unrest were harsh, both towards 
freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. Recent amendments to the Law on the Freedom 
of Assembly were passed on the 5th June 2012 and were quickly approved by the State Duma 
and Federal Council. The Human Rights Watch (2012) declared that these adjustments 
severely undercut the right to peaceful assembly; they dramatically increased the already high 
fines for individuals for the violation of the rules of public gatherings. The penalty rose from 
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10,000 roubles (£170) up to 300,000 roubles (£50,000) for individuals and from 15,000 roubles 
(£250) up to 600,000 roubles (£100,000) for organisers. Among the violations mentioned are 
the unsanctioned assemblies, blockage of transport routes and alcohol consumption. The 
biggest sanctions are imposed on those who repeatedly take part in unauthorised gatherings 
(more than twice in 180 days) – they could be fined up to the Russian equivalent of £17,000 
or sent to prison for up to five years (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Dobrokhotov, 2012). 
The legislative measure was supported by an odious court decision to sentence eight 
participants of the anti-Putin rally in May 2012. Tanya Lokshina, Russia’s Human Rights Watch 
programme director, deemed this case as ‘deeply flawed’ with ‘inappropriate charges’; 
nonetheless, in February 2014 the judge handed down prison sentences varying from two and 
a half to four years to all the defendants (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Subsequently, a law 
was passed on the NGOs receiving foreign funding – they were required to register as ‘foreign 
agents’.
Troubled freedom of assembly was accompanied with a number of laws restricting the 
freedom of speech that followed in the period between 2011 and 2014. In 2012, the Russian 
government passed a law allowing officials to shut down any website without a court order – 
the measure was explained as a means of protecting children from inappropriate content, such 
as drugs, suicide promotion and child pornography (Prikhodin, 2012). The opposition media 
and activists condemned the initiative arguing that it leads to further censorship of the Internet 
as executors can abuse the law as a means of curtailing freedom of speech (Malgin, 2014). 
In 2013, Russian communication regulators required Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to 
remove material that the watchdog considered objectionable, with only YouTube resisting and 
filing a lawsuit in the Russian court (Kramer, 2013). By 2014, the restriction was intensified by 
the notorious Law on Extremism that imposed unprecedented sanctions on those posting 
extremist pledges, such as ’liking’ or ‘reposting’ extremist information and pleas on the Internet 
– these users could face up to five years in jail (Kremlin Russia, 2014). The Law provided a 
rather vague definition of extremism and even labelled offences to human dignity and the 
spreading of non-Russian values as possible grounds for sanctions. The resistant public called 
the law controversial, open for abuse and manipulation against opposition (see, for instance, 
Malgin, 2014).
The year of 2014 brought worrisome news for four main sectors of independent media and 
alternative discourse platforms – the biggest online news outlet, major social network, 
independent television channel and social media faced new attacks from the government. 
Lenta.ru, the biggest independent online news website, had its respected editor-in-chief 
Galina Timchenko ousted for political reasons. That decision was followed by the resignation 
letters of dozens of journalists working in Lenta.ru, and the complete change of content and 
ideology (BBC, 2014). The statement released by the loyal editorial staff in response to 
Timchenko’s dismissal produced a now famous summary of the decline of free journalism in 
Russia: ‘The problem is not that there is nowhere left for us to work. The problem is that there 
is nothing left, it seems, for you to read’ (BBC, 2014). 
The largest online television channel Dozhd (TV Rain), famous for its independent 
investigative reports, experienced pressure on the economic side when leading cable and 
satellite operators suddenly dropped it. For example, Pavel Durov, the founder and general 
director of the most popular Russian social network Vkontakte, had a conflict with the 
12
government’s security services over data protection and privacy. He was forced to leave the 
company and flee from the country (The Moscow Times, 2014). 
Last but not least, a series of highly controversial laws imposed further restrictions on Russian 
social media. From the 1st August 2014, all popular blogs (more than 3000 visits per day) 
have been required to register with the communication watchdog and be judged on the same 
grounds as a media outlet. According to this Blogger Law, any popular blog could be shut 
down without a court order or be accused of extremism. In addition, this measure marks the 
end to online anonymity, as the owners of the blogs need to pass their personal details to the 
state agency. The Blogger Law provides a very ambiguous definition of a ‘blogger’: ‘the owner 
of the website or a webpage on the Internet which is used for publishing openly accessible 
information accessed by over 3000 people daily’ (Malgin, 2014). This provides a broad space 
for speculation, as the law does not clarify whether the owner of the Twitter account or Twitter 
as a company should register, whether Amazon.com or private users are affected. The 
Blogger Law punishes perpetrators for posting ‘false information presented as truthful’ or 
‘insulting individuals or specific categories of citizens with reference to their gender, age, race, 
nationality, language, religion, profession, place of residence and work, and their political 
views’ (Malgin, 2014: para. 25). The law thus leaves room for interpretation. A liberal blogger, 
for instance, can no longer accuse an official of corruption without a court decision as her post 
can be judged as ‘false information’. Insulting another’s political views is a second 
interpretative term for an offence. Furthermore, the law penalises for the deliberate 
suppression or concealment of the publicly important information. No criteria are provided. In 
summary, the ambiguity of recent Russian restrictive laws means that executors can treat 
them at their own discretion. As such, one could argue that the ruling elites have secured their 
immunity against criticism.
In 2014, the Russian government issued another polemic law that guaranteed further Internet 
restriction until 2016. Vladimir Putin obliged all Internet companies to store personal data on 
Russian citizens on Russian servers only, making them an easy target for the communication 
watchdog and intelligence services (Newsru.com, 2014). According to the Russian legislation, 
this data should be presented to the government officials at the first notice. 
Lastly, in 2014, the Russian government officially banned four main swear words in the 
Russian language from their use in the media, theatre, literature, music and blogs (Omidi, 
2014). The law on profanity is framed as a measure to protect the beauty of the Russian 
language; however, media professionals and researchers have called it an attack on the 
freedom of expression. Omidi (2014) reminds us that in China the similar ban on vulgarity led 
to a rise of euphemisms online. Klishin (2014) further notes that profanity played a serious role 
in resistance communication during the Soviet era. Dissent literature used profanity and slang 
as a linguistic opposition to the heavy clumsiness of the official bureaucratic expression. 
Klishin (2014) supports Omidi (2014) in assuming that the Russian Internet would resist this 
measure by use of euphemisms and savvy puns that further distinguish the resistant public 
from the conformist ones.
The number of legislative restrictions and cases of economic pressure on digital media and 
networks shows the political importance of this type of medium in modern Russia. Curiously, 
the firm position of the state willing to control and filter new media, points to the power of the 
Internet sphere in promoting alternative spaces for information distribution, discussion and 
political deliberation. Digital resistance of the mid-2010s is looking for ways of overcoming 
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state pressure and limitations. The history of Soviet dissent communication has shown that 
restrictions boost creativity and make people search for new methods and channels of 
expression. On the one hand, state pressure may inspire and annoy the protesting public, 
encouraging them to find innovative channels and styles of political activism. On the other, 
creative communication cannot be an end in itself. The protesting public need access to larger 
audiences to disseminate their message. The Russian government’s restrictions validate the 
role of the Internet as the facilitator of dissent, but pose serious challenges to dispersed 
resistant crowds.
Conclusion
The role of digital resistance in the current Russian political ecology has become a topic of 
much debate. The apparent success of the opposition publics in raising the awareness and 
calling people to the rallies in 2011-2012 was followed by the re-election of the same President 
and severe restrictions on freedom of speech. The hybrid regime of Vladimir Putin has proven 
that it would not tolerate criticism and reflections on the hegemonic political discourse. The 
resistant publics were condemned and further isolated into information ghettos. While a 
majority of the population believes state propaganda and traditional media, liberal publics find 
comfort in a small number of remaining liberal media and social network discussions. 
Social networks have a considerable potential in generating and maintaining political 
deliberation that has been excluded from the offline discourse. However, the translation from 
online discussions to offline actions remains a problematic task. The individualistic character 
of many liberal bloggers and Twitter users and the lack of affiliation with a specific political 
formation result in a dispersed political communication. Besides, the majority of the population 
tends to harvest their news and opinion from the state-controlled traditional media such as 
national broadcasting and press. Even those who obtain information and analysis from 4 or 5 
various resources, including online and offline outlets, mostly adhere to the predisposed views 
and seem reluctant to explore alternative perspectives.
Currently, the remaining Russian political dissent is shaped not by groups, but individuals. 
People are suspicious and careful in joining groups and communities and prefer individual 
over group identity. This specific characteristic of the Russian Internet poses challenges for 
political mobilisation and campaigning – people rely on their independent views and 
expressions and refrain from commitment to either online or offline groupings. Nonetheless, 
this peculiarity of the Russian Internet makes users less isolated in polar camps and facilitates 
interconnection between different platforms; the discussion migrates between individual 
accounts, uninhibited by membership or privacy settings. Furthermore, individualistic political 
deliberation online has a capacity to overcome censorship: it is dispersed and therefore less 
visible to the government watchdog. However, it has yet to be established whether this 
scattered and opinionated social network resistance is an obstacle or a benefit for political 
activism.
The protest community online faces challenges not only from within, but from the outside. The 
government separates liberal publics from the general audience by promoting dominant 
agenda via state-controlled outlets and labelling the dissidents as traitors. It allows existence 
of a small number of liberal media and opposition bloggers, which often aggregate protest 
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audience around burning issues. The government can monitor them to get insights on the 
protest moods in the society. At the same time, these segregated opposition hubs have little 
access to the broader audience and hence remain safe for the regime. Surprisingly, harsh 
media restrictions that fell on the Internet in recent years can be seen as a positive sign for 
the protest publics. This may mean that the Kremlin sees more threat in digital resistance than 
we do for the moment. It also signifies that in order to thrive, digital resistance needs more 
media resources and political opportunities becoming available. If the public approval of the 
President shifts or the state propaganda misidentifies with the public opinion, digital resistance 
has the most resources to reach the publics in doubt. Online resistance is open and 
accessible, free of charge and produced by people with solid writing skills – the only 
component missing is the inclination of the majority to look for the alternative points of view. 
Liberal media online and social networks resistance have already developed a fruitful platform 
to connect, debate and analyse. But in order to expand from an information ghetto to a larger 
medium, it requires structural and ideological changes in thesociety.
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